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Abstract
We show how spatial evolution is diﬀerent between the two repre-
sentative models of economic geography: Krugman (1991 JPE)a n d
Ottaviano et al. (2002 IER). We analyze the impacts of falling trans-
port costs on the spatial distribution of economic activities and welfare
for a network economy consisting of three regions located on a line.
In the former model, the central region always has locational advan-
tage and manufacturing workers gain from trade. In the latter model,
however, the opposite is true when markets are opened up to trade.
This is because the price competition is so keen in the central region
that manufacturing sector moves to the peripheral regions, which ag-
gravates the social welfare. We then show that when goods are close
substitutes and share of manufacturing is of an intermediate level,
the manufacturing activities completely disappears from the central
region leading to a full agglomeration in one peripheral region.
Keywords: second nature, market hierarchy, role of migration, agglom-
eration, autarky to trade, coordination failure.
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Most general equilibrium models on interregional and international economies
deal with two regions for analytical solvability. There are indeed a few excep-
tions that analytically consider multiple regions, such as Cremer, de Kerchove
and Thisse (1985), Economides and Siow (1988), Krugman (1993), Alesina
and Spolaore (1997), Casella (2001), Tabuchi, Thisse and Zeng (2002), and
Furusawa and Konishi (2002). But, since geographical space in these stud-
ies is perfectly symmetric, there as a result exist no locational advantage
and disadvantage among regions. For the sake of mathematical tractability,
analysis is usually conﬁned to ﬁnd symmetry breaking and agglomeration
sustain thresholds, where there is no room for a hierarchical system of cities.
In this paper, we tackle the analysis of asymmetric equilibria under asym-
metric locations of regions.S p e c i ﬁcally, we consider an asymmetric network
economy, where a central region is linked to two axisymmetrically located pe-
ripheral regions. Under this setting, one may expect that the central region
has locational advantages of home market eﬀects, accruing from accessibility
for ﬁrms to large market demand and for consumers to large supply of di-
verse goods. However, as argued by Venables and Limão (2002), the central
region may have locational disadvantages. If competition between ﬁrms is
ﬁerce, then ﬁrms would leave the central region for the peripheries in order
to avoid competition and seek local monopoly. This competition reduces the
wage level in the central region and decreases the utility level of consumers
(although they enjoy low prices of goods and a variety of goods). In general,
whether the central region is locationally advantageous or not is uncertain,
and hence this is one motivation for considering asymmetric location of re-
gions.
According to the core-periphery model typiﬁed by Krugman (1991), the
spatial conﬁguration of economic activities is dispersed for suﬃciently large
transport costs because the demand eﬀect by immobile farmers is dominant.
In the case of two regions, dispersion means the manufacturing share of each
region is 1/2, in which the price competition would be minimized and as the
farmers’ demand is well met. However, the notion of full dispersion is not so
obvious in the case of the asymmetric locations of three regions. In autarky,
price competition is relaxed most when each share is 1/3. In the case of
trade, however, price competition in the central region would be intensiﬁed
b e c a u s ea l lv a r i e t i e so fg o o d sa r ea v a i l a b l et h e r ew h i l es o m eo ft h e ma r en o t
available in the peripheral regions. It must be that competition is softer
2when the share in the central region is smaller than the peripheries, implying
that the equal share of 1/3 does not minimize price competition after trade
openings. This is another motivation for considering the asymmetric location
of regions.
In this paper, we study the impacts of falling transport costs and the
eﬀects of locational diﬀerences on the size and welfare of regions. In order to
depict the long-run evolutionary process of regional development, we start
from the position of autarky with an even distribution of economic activities.
The decrease in the transport costs enables ﬁrms to trade between regions,
which alters equilibrium prices, wages and proﬁts, and generates migration
of ﬁrms together with workers.
We utilize two representative core-periphery models of economic geogra-
phy under monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive markets,
namely that of Krugman (1991) and Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002).
Since the former assumes a CES utility function and iceberg transport costs,
we call it the CES model; and since the latter assumes a quadratic utility
function and linear transport costs, we call it the quadratic model hereafter.
It has been shown in the literature that both models with two regions yield
very similar results in terms of distributions of manufacturing activities: dis-
persion for large transport costs and agglomeration for small transport costs.
In the case of three asymmetric regions, one may conjecture the following
evolutionary process. When the transport costs are prohibitively large, each
region is in autarky with an equal share of manufacturing activities in either
model. In accordance with the decrease in transport costs, the central region
would steadily gain manufacturing share from the peripheries. When the
transport costs fall down suﬃciently, all the manufacturing activities would
agglomerate in the central region due to its locational advantage. This sce-
nario is conﬁrmed numerically in the CES model.1
However, this is not true in the quadratic model. It will be shown that
outcome is the complete reverse in the initial stages following the opening up
of markets to interregional trade. According to the quadratic model, since
the number of varieties suddenly increases in the central region owing to
imports from other regions, price competition intensiﬁes leading to a decrease
in the central region’s proﬁts. Furthermore, the CES model yields gains from
1In a diﬀerent setting, De Fraja and Norman (1993) analytically show that duopolistic
ﬁrms always cluster at the market center, where consumers are uniformly distributed over
a line segment.
3trade, whereas the quadratic model yields losses from trade. Our model is in
agreement with international trade models of Brander and Krugman (1983)
and Anderson, Schmitt and Thisse (1995). Such a contrast is not due to
the diﬀerence between mill pricing and discriminatory pricing, but due to a
diﬀerence between constant elasticity and variable elasticity.
This diﬀerence in the demand functions also exerts an inﬂuence on wel-
f a r e .I nt h eC E Sm o d e l ,ﬁrms gain from trade, which is augmented by free
migration to the central region due to its locational advantages. However,
the reverse is true in the quadratic model, where ﬁrms lose from trade. These
losses are aggravated by the freeing up of migration from the central region
due to its locational disadvantages. This would suggest that the prohibition
of free migration is welfare-enhancing in this early stages of development.
These ﬁndings comprise the primary result of this paper: the CES model
forms a striking contrast to the quadratic model.
B ym a k i n gt h em o s tu s eo fi t sa n a l y t i c a lt r a c t a b i l i t y ,w ec o m p l e t e l yc h a r -
acterize the equilibrium paths of the quadratic model . It will be shown
that despite its apparent locational advantages, the central region may not
experience growth throughout the evolutionary process. In fact, economic
activities in the center will relocate to the peripheries and may become to-
tally empty because ﬁrms want to avoid intense price competition. Note that
such behavior cannot occur in the case of two symmetric regions with trade
since there are no peripheries for ﬁrms to migrate to in order to relax price
competition.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The general setting
of three regions is described in the next section. The CES model is analyzed
when transport costs are large enough and numerical simulations are con-
ducted in Section 3. The results of the CES model are contrasted with those
of the quadratic model in Section 4. The stable interior equilibrium paths of
the quadratic model are examined and disappearance of the central region is
shown. Section 5 concludes.
2 Three regions
We consider a network economy made of three regions r =1 ,2,3.T h e ya r e
located equidistantly on a line, where region 2 is the central region and the
distance between regions 1 and 2 is equal to that between regions 2 and 3.
There are two factors, denoted A and L. Factor A is immobile and
4distributed evenly, while factor L is mobile and its share is λr ∈ [0,1].F o r
expositional purposes, we call the ﬁrst sector “agriculture” and the second
sector “manufacturing” so that A is “farmers” and L is “workers”. Thus,
there are A/3 immobile farmers and λrL mobile workers in region r.D e n o t e
the share of manufacturing workers by µ ≡ L/(A+L) and normalize A+L =
1.
The ﬁrst good is the numéraire, which is homogeneous and is produced
in the agricultural sector using factor A as the only input assuming constant
returns to scale and perfect competition. Technology in agriculture requires
one unit of A in order to produce one unit of the homogeneous good. Con-
sumers also have a positive initial endowment of this good. We assume that
this good can be traded costlessly between regions so that its price is identical
across regions. Hence, farmers’ income is equal to 1 in each region.
The second good is horizontally diﬀerentiated and is produced in the man-
ufacturing sector using factor L as the only input under increasing returns
to scale and monopolistic competition. Technology in manufacturing is such
that producing q(i) units of variety i requires l units of L given by
l = F + cq(i)
where F and c are the ﬁxed and marginal costs respectively. We assume that
there is a continuum of potential ﬁrms so that the impact of each ﬁrm on the
market outcome is negligible. Due to increasing returns to scale in production,
each ﬁrm produces a variety of diﬀerentiated goods and the total number of
ﬁrms in the whole economy is given by n = L/l.
Following a established tradition in economic geography, it is assumed
that markets for goods adjust instantaneously, while interregional migration
of ﬁrms and workers is relatively slow. After markets for goods are cleared,








burgh, Papageorgiou and Thisse (1985), λ
∗ is a spatial equilibrium when no
individual is able to get a higher utility level by moving to another region.
Mathematically, λ
∗ is a spatial equilibrium if V ∗ exists such that
Vr(λ








∗) is the indirect utility in region r. If there is no empty region, the
above second condition is unnecessary. In this case, the interior equilibrium





5Assuming that regions experience in-migration (resp., out-migration) if
its utility is higher (resp., lower) than the weighted average utility, we employ






















where the dot denotes the derivative with respect to time, and the redundant
equation for
·
λ2 is omitted since λ1 + λ2 + λ3 =1 . Equilibrium λ
∗ is asymp-
totically stable if any suﬃciently small change in the distribution results in
a movement back toward the equilibrium. Mathematically, it is stable if all
the real parts of eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (2) are negative. Since there
are two variables, the system is asymptotically stable (resp. unstable) if the
trace of the Jacobian is negative and (resp. positive or) the determinant of
the Jacobian is positive (resp. negative).
3C E S m o d e l













given the budget constraint
Z nr
0
p(i)q(i)di + qA = wr + qA (4)
where p(i) and q(i) a r et h ep r i c ea n dq u a n t i t yo fv a r i e t yi ∈ [0,n], qA is the
quantity of the numéraire, w is the nominal wage, and µ(> 0)a n dσ(> 1)
are parameters. The endowment of the numéraire qA is zero in this section.
A ﬁrm producing variety i maximizes its proﬁts:
π(i)=p(i)Q(i) − w(i)l






6Assuming the free entry of ﬁrms, π∗




F (σ − 1)
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The iceberg type of transport technology is assumed: if a unit of good
i is shipped from one region to the next region, only a fraction 1/T of the
original unit arrives. Therefore, if it is shipped from regions 1 to 3, 1/T2
arrives. Let prs(i) be the price of variety i produced in region r and sold in







which implies mill pricing. Even if each ﬁrm wanted to price discriminate be-
tween regions, competition under the CES utility with the iceberg transport
costs would force ﬁrms to use mill pricing (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, pp.327-
328). To ease the burden of notation, we drop i hereafter, but add subscripts
r,s =1 ,2,3for regions. Note that trade takes place between any regions for
all T<∞, which diﬀers from the next section with a linear demand.
With normalization of c =( σ − 1)/σ, F = µ/σ and λ1 +λ2 +λ3 =1 ,w e


























where Yr i st h ei n c o m eo fr e g i o nr and Gr is the price index in region r.T h e




Thus, the interior equilibria are obtained by simultaneously solving the ﬁve
equations of (6) and (1) with respect to three short-run variables w1, w2, w3
and two long-run variables λ1, λ3.
7In order for the “no-black-hole” condition to hold, the autarky equilibrium
λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) with T →∞and w∗
r =1should be stable in dynamics


















where each value is evaluated at T →∞ , λ
∗
r =1 /3 and w∗
r =1for all r.




which is identical to that of two regions.
3.1 Gains from trade and locational advantage
Next, consider the marginal change in the manufacturing distribution and
welfare when markets open up to trade at the symmetric equilibrium. In
the former case, we compute ∂λr/∂T for all r evaluated at T →∞ ,w h e r e
λ
∗
r =1 /3 and w∗
r =1holds for all r.2For the sake of mathematical simplicity,














9(σ − 1 − µσ)
< 0
where the inequalities are due to the no-black-hole condition (7). Since Tσ >
0,w eg e t∂λ1/∂T>0 and ∂λ2/∂T<0. Therefore, when the markets open
up to trade, the center 2 experiences an in-migration while the peripheries 1
and 3 out-migration, implying that the center has a locational advantage in
the vicinity of autarky.
2Since the equation system (6) is diﬀerentiable, the solution λ
∗ is also continuous insofar
as it is stable in the vicinity of T →∞ .






























when evaluated at the equilibrium values. This shows that falling transport
costs raises the welfare, i.e., gains from trade in the vicinity of autarky.
Likewise, the changes of farmers’ utility VAr = G−µ











3 − 3σ +4 µσ







3 − 3σ +2 µσ
1 − σ + µσ
< 0
where the inequality is from (7). Hence, farmers in the center gain from trade,
while net welfare for farmers in the peripheries is indeterminate. Comparing












That is, the gains for farmers in the center are the largest, followed by the
gains of workers.
W h a ti fm i g r a t i o no fw o r k e r si sn o ta l l o w e da si so f t e nt h ec a s ei nt h e
international economy. This is to compute the welfare changes of workers at










































In this case, the welfare changes of farmers are the same as above, thus
showing gains from trade for everyone. However, the gains are larger in the
center, which is consistent with the locational advantage mentioned above.
9The eﬀects of migration on the welfare can be revealed by the comparison







holds, migration plays a role in enhancing welfare increases, especially in the
center. Summarizing the above, we have the following.3
Proposition 1 Assume CES utility with iceberg transport costs. When mar-
kets open up to trade, each worker gains from trade. If migration is allowed,
the gains from trade increase further and the center attracts workers from
the peripheries due to its locational advantage.
In the case of two symmetric regions, we can similarly show the gains from
trade. It should be noted however that locational advantage does not arise
in two symmetric regions, which have no locational diﬀerences by deﬁnition.
3.2 Stable equilibrium path
The next question is how the distribution of workers evolve as transport
costs are steadily decreasing. Unfortunately, however, the CES model is
not analytically solvable due to its high non-linearity, and hence we conduct
simulations given some parameter values. We start from the inﬁnite transport
costs T = ∞, where the initial equilibrium distribution is given by λ
∗ =
(1/3,1/3,1/3), which is stable under the no-black-hole condition (7).
With σ =2and µ =0 .1, we computed an equilibrium path numerically
a n dd e p i c t e di ti nF i g u r e1 .A se x p e c t e d ,the central region expands continu-
o u s l yf r o mf u l ld i s p e r s i o nt of u l la g g l o m e r a t i o n(0,1,0).B ys i m u l a t i o n sw i t h
diﬀerent values of the parameters, we found intuitive results that the agglom-
eration is likely to occur if the varieties are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (small
σ) and if the share of the manufacturing sector is large (large µ). However,
it will be shown that the property of this equilibrium path is substantially
diﬀerent from that in the quadratic model.
3The same proposition is shown to hold by using a similar model to Forslid and Ot-
taviano (2003). This would imply that these results are attributable to CES utility with
iceberg transport costs.
104 Quadratic model
In this section, replacing the CES model with the quadratic model of Otta-
viano et al. ( 2 0 0 2 ) ,w ei n v e s t i g a t ew h e t h e ro rn o tw ec a nr e p r o d u c et h es a m e


















where nr is the number of available varieties in region r, α > 0,a n dβ > γ >
0. Any individual is endowed with qA units of the numéraire, and maximizes
the utility (8) given the budget constraint:
Z nr
0
p(i)q(i)di + qA = wr + qA
The ﬁrst-order conditions are














0 p(j)dj, σ ≡ γn/(β − γ) and n(≥ nr) is the total number
of ﬁrms (varieties) in the economy, which are similar deﬁn i t i o n sa si nt h e




2γ (n + σnr)
−
ασGr












2 dj. As in the previous section, we drop i hereafter.
The production sector is the same as before except that c =0is as-
sumed for analytical simplicity. Still increasing returns to scale prevail in the
manufacturing sector because of F>0. Labor market clearing implies that
n = L/F = L/l is constant. The transport technology is linear: τrr =0for
11r =1 ,2,3, τ12 = τ23 = τ, τ13 =2 τ,w h e r eτ is the transport costs per unit
shipped per unit distance.4
Each ﬁrm is able to price discriminate between spatially separated mar-
kets. Let prs be the price of a food produced in region r a n ds o l di nr e g i o ns,
and qrs(prs) is the demand in region s for a good produced in region r.L e t
ˆ qrs(prs)=m a x{qrs(prs),0}
If trade does not take place from regions r to s,t h e nˆ qrs(prs)=0 .S i n c e
the regional sizes diﬀer in general, one-way trade from regions s to r may
arise in equilibrium, which is ˆ qrs(prs)=0and ˆ qsr(psr) > 0.S u c hao n e - w a y
t r a d ed o e sn o ta r i s ei nt h eC E Sm o d e lb e c a u s et h eC E Sd e m a n di sp o s i t i v e
for all positive prices of import. We call autarky if ˆ qrs(prs)=0for all r 6= s;
neighboring trade if ˆ q13(p13)=ˆ q31(p31)=0and ˆ qrs(prs) > 0 otherwise; full
trade if ˆ qrs(prs) > 0 for all r,s.
Each price-discriminating ﬁrm incurs the transport costs, the proﬁts of a













Maximizing (9) yields k equations of the ﬁrst-order conditions with k un-
known prices. For example, k =3for autarky since ˆ qrs(prs)=0for all r 6= s;
k =7for neighboring trade since ˆ q13(p13)=ˆ q31(p31)=0 ;a n dk =9for full





where As = {r|q∗




















for r ∈ As (10)
4Alternatively, τ may be regarded as the costs of loading and unloading a unit good
between neighboring regions. In the network economy, each good should be unloaded and
loaded at the center of a port town when transporting it from one periphery to the other.
12Thus, the equilibrium price depends not only upon produced and sold regions,
but also upon the whole trade pattern. For example, p∗
11 stands for the
autarky price in region 1 when A1 = {1}, and the price of a home good when
A1 = {1,2} or {1,2,3}; while p∗
21 is the import price of a foreign good when
A1 = {1,2} or {1,2,3}.
Likewise, given the trade pattern, the gross and net proﬁts of a ﬁrm
























A s s u m i n gt h ef r e ee n t r yo fﬁrms, π∗
r =0holds, and hence the equilibrium













When the transport costs are suﬃciently high, ﬁrms are not concerned











Solving it with λ







which is common for all regions.
Consider next the trade-opening condition. Trade opens up if the export
price is exceeds the transport costs: p∗
rs > τrs,w h i c hi sp∗






This means that smaller regions are more likely to import goods because
of weak price competition. Substituting the symmetric autarky equilibrium
5We exclude possibility of asymmetric autarky equilibria since they may become un-
stable once trade opens up as shown by Behrens (2003) in the case of two regions.
13λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) into the trade-opening condition (12) with equality, we




at which point trade begins.
Since τtrade is increasing in α and decreasing in σ, trade is likely to open
up when the demand is high (high α), each variety is diﬀerentiated (low
γ), there are few ﬁrms and workers (small n and L), and/or transporting
technology is improved (low τ).
Computing eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (2) and evaluating them at
λ







which corresponds to the “no-black-hole” condition in the quadratic model.
4.1 Losses from trade and locational disadvantage
When τ = τtrade,s o m eﬁrms are able to get positive demand q∗
rs > 0 from
neighboring regions if the autarky equilibrium is perturbed. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁrms in region r earn positive (resp. no) proﬁts by exporting to neighboring
regions s if λs of (12) is smaller (resp. equal to or greater) than 1/3 for
|r − s| =1 . It is shown in Appendix B that there are four types of one-way
trade patterns (C1)-(C4) generated by perturbations near the equilibrium
λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3). In addition, when τ becomes just below τtrade,t h eﬁfth
type of neighboring trade pattern (C5) emerges in the vicinity of λ
∗,w h i c h
is examined in Appendix C. In these patterns,trade between the peripheral
r e g i o n sd o e sn o to c c u r .
In summary, we show below that there are three possible equilibrium
paths for decreasing transport costs depending upon the parameter values.
Let thresholds be
ˆ µ2 ≡
4σ(5σ +1 8 )






2 ≡ min{ˆ µ2, ¯ µ2}
6See Behrens (2003) for equilibrium stability of autarky and one-way trade in the case
of two regions.
14where max{ˆ µ2, ¯ µ2} <µ ∗
3 holds. The three cases are dealt with the following
three lemmas respectively.
Lemma 1 If µ<ˆ µ2, the symmetric equilibrium λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) is
stable at τ = τtrade.
In proving Lemma 1, we should consider perturbations of λ generating 4
kinds of one-way trade patterns, which are contained in Appendix B. It as-
sures stability for µ<ˆ µ2, which is subdivided into two cases: Lemmas 2 and
3b e l o w .N o t et h a tw h e nˆ µ2 <µ<µ ∗
3, trade opening breaks the symmetric
equilibrium and triggers an agglomeration of manufacturing activities. In
this case, a unique equilibrium may not arise: for example both (1/2,0,1/2)
and (0,1,0) are stable equilibria depending on the initial distribution.
Lemma 2 If µ<µ ∗
2, there exists a unique stable equilibrium path, which
passes through λ










The proof is contained in Appendix C. Lemma 1 shows that whenever
there exists a unique stable equilibrium path, the central region necessarily
shrinks continuously. However, such uniqueness does not hold in the following
case (the proof is in Appendix D).
Lemma 3 If ¯ µ2 <µ<ˆ µ2, the autarky equilibrium λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3)
trifurcates stable equilibrium paths when trade opens at τ = τtrade.O n e o f
t h ep a t hh a st h es a m ep r o p e r t ya s( 1 4 ) .
In sum, given the “no-black-hole” condition (13), at least one of the paths
or trajectories moves toward the decrease in the size of the central region
( L e m m a s1a n d3 )i nt h ev i c i n i t yo fτ = τtrade.I n o r d e r t o c o n t i n u e n e a t




in which there is a unique stable equilibrium path corresponding to falling
transport costs (Lemma 2). Note that all varieties are available in the cen-
tral region, whereas some of them are not in the peripheries, which exhibits
market hierarchy in the central place theory of Christaller (1933). Neverthe-
less, by use of Lemma 2, we can show that the central region is smaller than
the peripheries and that its welfare is lower than the peripheries as follows.
15Proposition 2 Assume the quadratic utility with linear transport costs. For
µ<µ ∗
2, although there are more varieties in the central region, it necessarily
shrinks and all workers are worse oﬀ when trade opens up.
Proposition 2 states that in spite of its geographical advantage, the size of
the central region becomes smaller than that of the peripheral regions.7 This
is explained by the ﬁrms’ behavior to relax keen price competition generated
by the trade opening. At the very initial stages of trade, ﬁrms in the central
region can export to two peripheral regions, while ﬁrms in the peripheral
regions can export to the central region only. However, the central region’s
ﬁrms compete with ﬁrms from all regions, whereas ﬁrms in the peripheral re-
gions only compete with those in the central region. The net outcome is that
the price competition eﬀect dominates the market area eﬀect, which induces
movement to the peripheries. Comparing Proposition 2 with Proposition 1,
we know that the quadratic model is shown to be opposite to the CES model.
Next, consider the change in the welfare when τ gets just below τtrade,
at which the neighboring trade or one-way trade to the center is about to
take place. This is to evaluate dVr/dτ at τ = τtrade and λ















ασ2 (2 − µ)[(19σ +3 6 )µ − 8σ]
2(σ +6 )[ ( 3 4 σ2 +1 5 3 σ +1 6 2 )µ − 2σ (7σ + 18)]γn
> 0
under µ<µ ∗
2. Therefore, workers lose from trade, i.e. falling transport
costs τ decrease the welfare of all workers. Applying similar calculations for
farmers’ utility VAr with w∗
A =1 ,w eo b t a i n
dVAr
dτ
< 0 r =1 ,3
Hence, falling transport costs τ raises the welfare of peripheral farmers. This
is because peripheral farmers are better oﬀ due to the in-migration of ﬁrms.
7Fujita and Mori (1997) conducted simulations and obtained a similar result of loca-
tional disadvantage in the center. However, it seems to be attributed to the fact that there
are unevenly more farmers in the peripheries in their model. On the other hand, farmers
are equally distributed in our model. Nevertheless, we have locational disadvantage in the
center, which is due to price competition under non-constant elastic demand.
16In order to see the net eﬀects of the opening of markets to trade on social





where VAr is the farmer’s utility in region r =1 ,2,3.S u c has u m m a t i o ni s
possible since the quasi-linear utility is transferable. It can be readily shown
that dW/dτ > 0 in the neighborhood of τ = τtrade. In sum, we have the
following.
Proposition 3 Assume the quadratic utility with linear transport costs. For
µ<µ ∗
2, all manufacturing workers are worse oﬀ, whereas farmers in the
peripheries are better oﬀ when markets are open to trade. In net, the social
welfare decreases.
Although more varieties of goods become available due to the trade open-
ings, all manufacturing workers are worse oﬀ in the quadratic model. There-
fore, we also conﬁrm that the quadratic and CES models are shown to give
reverse outcomes by comparing Proposition 3 with Proposition 1. This wel-
fare loss from trade in the manufacturing sector is also observed in a Cournot
duopoly model of two countries developed by Brander and Krugman (1983).
What if migration is not allowed as in the context of international econ-







∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) and τ = τtrade. Applying similar calcula-






That is, the welfare loss is greater when migration is free, which implies
interregional migration of ﬁrms and workers aggravates the social welfare.
Again, this is opposite to the result of Proposition 1.
It can be shown that prohibition of migration is socially suboptimal. The
ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimum allocation of manufacturing activities
17are ∂W/∂λ1 = ∂W/∂λ2 =0after plugging λ3 =1 − λ1 − λ2 into W.8
Evaluating these conditions at τ = τtrade and λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3),w eh a v e
∂W/∂λ1 =0and ∂W/∂λ2 > 0.T h i sm e a n sλ2 should be larger than 1/3 in
optimum. Hence, when markets are about to open to trade, the optimum
size of the central region is larger than that under prohibited migration, but
smaller than that where free migration is allowed.
4.2 Stable equilibrium path
Consider the steady decrease in τ as before. Given the stability condition
µ<µ ∗
2, the equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) passing through (1/3,1/3,1/3) continues
to be asymptotically stable for τ just below τtrade. However, there is no
guarantee that the stable path is always continuous for falling transport
costs. Nevertheless, we can show the following strong result (the proof is
given in Appendix E).
Lemma 4 For µ<µ ∗
2, the stable equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) passing through






Lemma 4 says that any trajectory near the axisymmetric conﬁguration
λ1 = λ3 is directed toward the line λ1 = λ3. It follows that even if the
stable equilibrium λ
∗ becomes unstable or disappears, the trajectory start-
ing from the old equilibrium should go in the direction of the new stable
equilibrium which is axisymmetric. This is because any small perturbation
(±ε1,∓ε3) near an axisymmetric equilibrium results in a movement back to
the equilibrium. Suppose an equilibrium path suddenly disappears or be-
comes unstable. Since the axisymmetry property holds from Lemma 4, the
two-dimensional dynamics with (λ1,1 − λ1 − λ3,λ3) behaves similar to one-
dimensional dynamics with (λ1,1−2λ1,λ1). As a result, the direction toward
a new equilibrium can be uniquely determined. When the stable equilibrium
λ
∗ becomes unstable or disappears, the smaller (resp. larger) regions get
smaller (resp. larger) regions with a sudden jump. This implies that there
exists a unique stable equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) for the whole domain of µ<µ ∗
2.
Next, we show that there are two types of interior stable equilibrium path
λ
∗(τ) according to the parameter values of µ and σ.S i n c e V1 = V3 always
8This optimum is called the second-best optimum in Ottaviano and Thisse (2002).




3, we focus on the curve
∆V12(λ1,τ) ≡ V1 − V2|λ2=1−2λ1,λ3=λ1 =0
which passes through (λ1,τ)=( 1 /3,τtrade) and intersects with λ1 =1 /2
if f(λ1) > 0 holds for all λ1 ∈ [1/3,1/2] (where f(λ1) is deﬁned by (26)
in Appendix E). It can be shown that f(λ1) > 0 for all λ1 ∈ [1/3,1/2]
is equivalent to g(µ,σ) ≡ f(˜ λ1) > 0,w h e r e˜ λ1 is the smallest solution of
f0(λ1)=0 .L e tˆ µ1 = µ(σ) be the function derived from the implicit function
g(µ,σ)=0 . Then, we have the following (the proof is given in Appendix F).
Lemma 5 Assume the quadratic utility with linear transport costs. The in-
terior stable equilibrium path passing through (λ1,τ)=( 1 /3,τtrade) is either
one of the following:
If ˆ µ1 <µ<µ ∗
2,t h e nλ
∗
2 decreases monotonically from 1/3 to 0 at positive
τ;
if µ<ˆ µ1,t h e nλ
∗
2 decreases from 1/3 and then increases to 1.
In either case of Lemma 5, the central region becomes small at trade
openings in spite of more available varieties there. In the former case, when
λ
∗
2 reaches 0, the corner equilibrium (1/2,0,1/2) is realized. Since the man-
ufacturing is empty in region 2, one-way trade from the peripheral to the
central regions takes place. Computing stability and equilibrium conditions
for this equilibrium, we can ﬁnd a positive threshold of τ such that this equi-
librium will cease to exist or become unstable. We do not know the new
stable equilibrium at the threshold, but it is certain that for a suﬃcient de-
crease in τ, the new stable equilibrium always involves full agglomeration:
(1,0,0), (0,1,0) or (0,0,1). In the latter case, once λ
∗
2 reaches 1,t h ec e n t r a l
agglomeration (0,1,0) continues to be a stable equilibrium all the time.
Examining both interior and corner stable paths, we establish the follow-
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√
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where µ∗
1 > ˆ µ1 (the proof is contained in Appendix G).




2, the share of the central region shrinks continuously
and reaches 0 realizing full agglomeration in one of the peripheries.
(ii) If µ<min{µ∗
1,µ ∗
2}, then the share of the central region ﬁrst decreases
from 1/3 and then increases to 1.
The domain of the two cases (i) and (ii) in the (σ,µ) coordinates is given in
Figure 2, and the stable paths in the (τ,λ
∗
2) coordinates are drawn in Figure
3. Observe in both cases (i) and (ii) that the full dispersion during the initial
autarky is due to the demand eﬀect of immobile farmers, while the partial
agglomeration in the peripheries is ascribed to the price competition eﬀect for
intermediate transport costs. Thus, dominance of these two dispersion forces
depends on the stages of development in the case of asymmetric location,
whereas the two forces are not separated in the case of symmetric location
models.
In case (ii) of small manufacturing share µ, the central region becomes
smaller when τ is just below τtrade as shown in Proposition 2, but it will be
larger for small τ, and full agglomeration at the center (λ
∗
2 =1 )i sr e a l i z e d
in the end,9 which is consistent with Christaller’s (1933) central place the-
ory. Thus, as transport costs steadily decrease, the equilibrium conﬁguration
involves, ﬁrst, full dispersion, then partial agglomeration in the peripheries
and, last agglomeration in the central region.10
On the other hand, in case (i) of intermediate manufacturing share µ
and high substitutability σ, the stable equilibrium path is totally diﬀerent.
When trade opens up, λ
∗







2/2),w h i c hr e a c h e s(1/2,0,1/2). For a further decrease in τ,
(1/2,0,1/2) breaks and full agglomeration at one periphery is realized, but
not at the center, thus necessarily exhibiting undesirable agglomeration in
the end. That is, the central region steadily loses manufacturing activities
and becomes empty after all in spite of its seemingly locational advantage.
Such a counterintuitive result may be explained by the two opposite
forces. First, the force of dispersion is associated with the high degree of
substitutability among varieties, which means keen price competition. As
9To be more precise, there are two subcases of (ii) for intermediate τ.I f ˆ µ1 <µ<
min{µ∗
1,µ ∗
2},t h e nλ
∗
2 =0 ;b u ti fµ<ˆ µ1,t h e nλ
∗




10Such a bell-shaped relationship between the transport costs and spatial distribution
is somewhat related to the Hotelling’s model with logit (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse,
1992, chapter 9.4).
20previously mentioned, the dispersion force does not lead to full dispersion,
but migration toward peripheries, leading to the conﬁguration (1/2,0,1/2)
at the intermediate stage of development (medium τ). Second, the force
driving full agglomeration is the large share of manufacturing activities µ,
which often upsets a desirable location of manufacturing activities deter-
mined by the “ﬁrst nature” (Cronon, 1991). In case (i), it is the “second
nature” (1/2,0,1/2) at the intermediate stage that selects full agglomeration
in one periphery at the later stage. This is typical coordination failure since
the peripheral agglomeration is worse than the central agglomeration.
5C o n c l u s i o n
What is important for regional growth is not the “ﬁrst nature” of geograph-
ically convenient locations, as much as the “second nature” of market inter-
actions among ﬁrms and consumers. We have shown that the roles of these
natures are diﬀerent between the two seemingly similar models: the CES
model with iceberg transport technology and the quadratic model with the
linear transport technology. They yield the same market outcome in that
large transport costs lead to dispersion, and small transport costs lead to
agglomeration. However, we have shown that the results are opposite in the
case of three regions when the markets opens up to trade. Whereas the CES
model always exhibits the locational advantage in the central region and
gains from trade (Proposition 1), the quadratic model shows the locational
disadvantage (Proposition 2) as well as losses from trade (Proposition 3).
Such a sharp contrast is ascribed to the diﬀerences in demand elasticity.
While the degree of price competition among monopolistically competitive
ﬁr m si sm o d e r a t ei nt h eC E Sm o d e l ,i ti sh i g ha tt h eo p e n i n gu po fm a r k e t st o
trade in the quadratic model. Fierce price competition leads to the so-called
prisoners’ dilemma. Each ﬁrm is worse oﬀ due to a price war, resulting in the
decrease in the workers’ wages and utility levels. Furthermore, the welfare
losses are aggravated in the presence of interregional migration. In order
to avoid intense levels of price competition, mobile ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r sm o v e
away from the central region, which generates wasteful transport costs and
hence lowers social welfare.
This coordination failure persists and aﬀects the long-run growth of re-
gions during a gradual decrease in transport costs. As shown in Proposition 4
(i), when goods are close substitutes and the manufacturing share is interme-
21diate, the manufacturing activities in the central region becomes completely
vacant. In the end, bad agglomeration is realized at either of the peripheries,
exhibiting that the regional evolution is subject to the lock-in eﬀect together
with the “second nature”.
Appendix A: Comparative statics
(i) Applying comparative statics to (6), f4 ≡ V1 − w1/G
µ
1 =0and f5 ≡
V3 − w3/G
µ
3 =0 ,w eh a v e

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   

µ − 10 0 0 0
0 µ − 10 0 0
00 µ − 100
3
µ
1−σ (µ − 1) 0 0 1 0
03
µ
1−σ (µ − 1) 0 0 1

   

−1 
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    

µ − 10 0 3 ( µ − 1) 0
0 µ − 10 0 3 ( µ − 1)
00 µ − 13 ( 1 − µ)3 ( 1 − µ)
3
µ
1−σ (µ − 1) 3
µ










1−σ (µ − 1) 0 3
µ
























   

where each element is evaluated at T →∞ , λ
∗
r =1 /3 and w∗
r =1for all r.













9(σ − 1 − µσ)
< 0
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1
From (12), the boundary conditions are λr =1 /3 (r =1 ,2,3), which
are λ1 =1 /3, λ1 + λ3 =2 /3 and λ3 =1 /3 in the (λ1,λ3) coordinates. In
considering perturbations in the vicinity of λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3),w ea n a l y z e
only four domains (C1)-(C4) in Figure 4due to the axisymmetry between
regions 1 and 3.
23(C1) One-way trade from 1 and 3 to 2:
Computing the Jacobian of (2) and evaluating it at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3)
with τ = τtrade, we have the stability condition: µ<ˆ µ2. Applying the
implicit function theorem to y1 =0and y3 =0at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) with







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
y1=0
=
4σ(7σ +1 8 )− µ(41σ2 +2 5 2 σ +3 2 4 )











4σ(7σ +1 8 )− µ(41σ2 +2 5 2 σ +3 2 4 )
< 0
Hence the equilibrium is stable within domain (C1) for µ<ˆ µ2.
(C2) One-way trade from 1 to 2 and neighboring trade between 2 and 3:
Suppose the equilibrium moves to (λ1,λ3)=( 1 /3+ε1,1/3 − ε3) for suf-
ﬁciently small ε1 and ε3 with ε1 > ε3 > 0. Then, ignoring the second or
higher order terms, we have
dy1 ≈
α2σ[µ(41σ2 +2 5 2 σ +3 2 4 )− (7σ +1 8 ) ]
6γµ(σ +2 )( σ +6 )
3 ε1−
α2σ3 (2 − µ)
6γµ(σ +2 )( σ +3 )( σ +6 )
2ε3 < 0
for all ε1 > ε3 > 0 and µ<ˆ µ2.L i k e w i s e , w e h a v e dy3 > 0. Hence,
any deviation within domain (C2) will necessarily come back to the original
equilibrium λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3).
(C3) Autarky in 1 and one-way trade from 2 to 3:
From the Jacobian of (2) evaluated at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) with τ = τtrade,
we have the stability condition:
µ<˘ µ ≡
4σ(2σ +9 )
13σ2 +9 9 σ + 162







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
y1=0
=








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
y3=0
=0
Since the former is less than the slope of the boundary λ3 =2 /3−λ1,w h i c h
is −1, for all µ<ˆ µ2 < ˘ µ, it passes through domain (C3). Thus, both are
24nonpositive for all µ<˘ µ, which means the equilibrium is stable in domain
(C3).
(C4) One-way trade from 2 to 1 and 3:
Suppose the equilibrium moves to (λ1,λ3)=( 1 /3 − ε1,1/3 − ε3) for suf-
ﬁciently small ε1,ε3 > 0. Then, ignoring the second or higher order terms,
we have
dy1 ≈
α2σ[4σ(2σ +9 )− µ(13σ2 +9 9 σ +1 6 2 ) ]
2γµ(σ +3 )( σ +6 )
3 ε1 +
α2σ3 (2 − µ)
2γµ(σ +3 )( σ +6 )
3ε3 > 0
dy3 ≈
α2σ3 (2 − µ)
2γµ(σ +3 )( σ +6 )
3ε1 +
α2σ[4σ(2σ +9 )− µ(13σ2 +9 9 σ +1 6 2 ) ]
2γµ(σ +3 )( σ +6 )
3 ε3 > 0
for all ε1,ε3 > 0 and µ<ˆ µ2. Hence, any deviation within domain (C4) will
necessarily come back to the original equilibrium.






We will show that when for τ is just below τtrade, the stable path enters the
domain of neighboring trade between 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3 (C5) in
Figure 5 for µ<ˇ µ (Lemma 6) and the domain of one-way trade from 1 and 3
to 2 (C1) for ˇ µ<µ<ˆ µ2 (Lemma 7), but that it does not enter the domains
of (C2), (C3) and (C4) (Lemmas 8-10). The shaded triangular domain of
(C5) is given by the three boundary conditions (12), where λr is no longer
1/3 since τ is slightly less than τtrade. The vertexes of the triangle in Figure

























Lemma 6 If µ<ˇ µ, the stable equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) passing through λ
∗ =







25Proof. In the case of neighboring trade,we compute the Jacobian of (2)
and evaluate it at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) with τ = τtrade. Then, the stability
condition is given by
µ<˜ µ ≡
2σ(7σ +1 8 )
34σ2 +1 5 3 σ +1 6 2
(16)
Applying the implicit function theorem to y1 = y3 =0at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3)







(2 − µ)σ(σ +6 )
2
18α[µ(34σ2 +1 5 3 σ +1 6 2 )− 2σ (7σ +1 8 ) ]
< 0 (17)
where the inequality is due to (16). Therefore, the slope of the stable equi-
librium path is 1.
On the other hand, the marginal change in the ﬁrst vertex of (15) at







(σ +6 ) 2
18ασ
< 0 (18)
Hence, the vertex moves toward the same direction as the stable equilib-
rium path for a marginal decrease in τ. In order for the stable equilibrium
path λ
∗(τ) to enter the domain of neighboring trade (C5), the change in the
stable path (17) is smaller then the latter (18) in absolute value, i.e.
−
(σ +6 ) 2
18ασ
<
(2 − µ)σ(σ +6 )
2
18α[µ(34σ2 +1 5 3 σ +1 6 2 )− 2σ(7σ +1 8 ) ]
< 0
The ﬁrst inequality is equivalent to µ<ˇ µ. However, since ˇ µ<˜ µ,t h i sl e m m a
holds for µ<ˇ µ.
Lemma 7 If ˇ µ<µ<ˆ µ2, the stable equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) passing through
λ







Proof. Computing and evaluating the Jacobian of (2) at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3)
with τ = τtrade for one-way trade to the center,we have the stability condition
µ<ˆ µ2 (19)
26The comparative statics at λ







2σ(σ +6 ) 2(2 − µ)
9α[µ(37σ2 +2 5 2 σ +3 2 4 )− 4σ(5σ +1 8 ) ]
< 0
where the inequality is due to (19).
In order for the equilibrium path to enter the domain of the one-way trade
to the center (C1), it is necessary that
2σ(σ +6 ) 2(2 − µ)
9α[µ(37σ2 +2 5 2 σ +3 2 4 )− 4σ (5σ +1 8 ) ]
< −
(σ +6 ) 2
18ασ
< 0
which is equivalent to ˇ µ<µ . Hence, this lemma is true for ˇ µ<µ<ˆ µ2.
Lemma 8 There is no stable equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) passing through λ
∗ =
(1/3,1/3,1/3) at τ = τtrade that enters domain (C2).
Proof. Computing and evaluating the Jacobian of (2) at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3)
with τ = τtrade for one-way trade from 1 to 2 and neighboring trade between






2 (σ +3 )> 0 (20)
The comparative statics at λ




(µ − 2)σ(σ +6 ) 2
9α[(53σ3 + 453σ2 + 1188σ + 972)µ2 − 12σ(5σ2 +2 8 σ + 36)µ +1 6 σ2 (σ +3 ) ]
< 0
where inequality holds from (20). Thus, any slight decrease in τ leads to
λ3 > 1/3, which does not pass through domain (C2).
Lemma 9 If µ<¯ µ2, then there is no stable equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) passing
through λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) at τ = τtrade that enters domain (C3).
Proof. Computing and evaluating the Jacobian of (2) at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3)
with τ = τtrade autarky in 1 and one-way trade from 2 to 3,we have the sta-
bility condition
µ<˘ µ (21)
Since ˆ µ2 < ˘ µ, stability condition (21) is met. The comparative statics at
λ




(µ − 2)σ(σ +6 ) 2
9α[(13σ2 +9 9 σ +1 6 2 ) µ − 4σ (2σ +9 ) ]
> 0 (22)
27where the inequality holds from (21). We also have dλ3/dλ1 = −2 along the
equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) at τ = τtrade.
In order for the equilibrium path to enter domain (C3), λ
∗(τ) should not
enter the neighboring trade triangle (C5). This is shown to be equivalent
that (22) is smaller than the partial derivative of the vertical axis of the
southeast vertex (2(α − τ)/στ,[(σ +4 ) τ − 4α]/στ) in absolute value. A
straightforward computation yields µ>¯ µ2.
Lemma 10 There is no stable equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) passing through λ
∗ =
(1/3,1/3,1/3) at τ = τtrade that enters domain (C4).
Proof. Computing and evaluating the Jacobian of (2) at λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3)
with τ = τtrade f o ro n e - w a yt r a d ef r o mt h ec e n t e r ,w eh a v et h es t a b i l i t yc o n -
dition
µ<¯ µ2 (23)
The comparative statics at λ







2(µ − 2)σ(σ +6 ) 2
18α[(14σ2 +9 9 σ +1 6 2 ) µ − 2σ(5σ +1 8 ) ]
> 0
where the inequality holds from (23). In order for the equilibrium path to
enter the domain of the one-way trade from the center (C4), it is necessary
that
(µ − 2)σ(σ +6 ) 2
18α[(14σ2 +9 9 σ +1 6 2 ) µ − 2σ(5σ +1 8 ) ]
>
(σ +6 ) 2
36ασ
or equivalently µ>¯ µ2, which contradicts (23).
A p p e n d i xD :P r o o fo fL e m m a3
We show that when ¯ µ2 <µ<ˆ µ2,t h e r ea r e3 stable equilibrium paths
passing through λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) at τ = τtrade.








in the vicinity of λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) with τ = τtrade.T h i sp r o p e r t yi st h e
same as (14).
28Since ¯ µ2 <µ<ˆ µ2 < ˘ µ, two other stable paths are shown to exist from
the proof of Lemma 9: one is in (C3) and the other is in (C3’). When the
stable path enters (C3), from µ<ˆ µ2 < ˘ µ, the stability condition (21) is









which is due to (22) and dλ3/dλ1 = −2. Similarly, we can show that when









Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 4
Deﬁne yrs ≡ ∂yr/∂λs|λ∗
1=λ∗
3.S i n c e y11 = y33 and y13 = y31,t h et w o











λ3)=( y11 − y13)X
in the vicinity of an axisymmetric equilibrium. We show y11 − y13 < 0
below so that X goes to zero, which necessarily results in the axisymmetric





at which full trade starts.
(i) Neighboring trade: 0 <µ≤ ˇ µ and ¯ τtrade ≤ τ ≤ τtrade.






/∂λr about an axisymmetric
equilibrium because V1 −
P3
s=1 λsVs =0holds, we have
sgn(y11 − y13)=sgn(τ (λ1) − τ) (24)
where
τ (λ1)=
2α(4σ − 18µ − 19µσ +2 7 µσλ1)
σ(2λ1 − 1)(4σ − 6µ − 13µσ +2 1 µσλ1)
(25)
29It is readily shown that τ0 (λ1) < 0 for all µ<ˆ µ2. Four cases may arise.
(i-a) For 0 <µ≤ ˆ µ1 and ¯ τtrade ≤ τ ≤ τtrade.
Solving τ (0) = ¯ τtrade yields sgn(¯ τtrade − τ (0)) =sgn(2σ/(8σ +9 )− µ).
If µ<2σ/(8σ +9 ) ,t h e nw eh a v eτ ≥ ¯ τtrade > τ (0) > τ (λ1),w h e r et h el a s t
inequality is due to τ0 (λ1) < 0.T h a ti s ,i fµ<2σ/(8σ +9 ) ,t h e ny11 <y 13
holds from (24). Therefore, we only have to show ˆ µ1 < 2σ/(8σ +9 ) .
Let
f(λ1) ≡ 36µ2σ2 (λ1)
4 − 12µσ (108µ +2 σ +7 3 µσ)(λ1)
3









35µ2σ2 + 118µ2σ +9 9 µ2 − µσ2 − 14µσ − 18µ +2 σ2 +4 σ
¢
(26)
Tedious computations yield a discriminant of the fourth-order polynomial
f(λ1)as
J (µ,σ) ≡ (47990870424σ10 + 818858377608σ9 + 6233866885776σ8 + 27871575543648σ7
+81006445037160σ6 + 159828536439576σ5 + 216649318299408σ4 + 199048380545664σ3
+118496258578656σ2 + 41214652554240σ + 6347497291776)µ9 + (244773597756σ10
+4033200123992σ9 + 29638387205080σ8 + 127933562389632σ7 + 359305187569956σ6
+686338813527120σ5 + 903560758379424σ4 + 810184042378368σ3 + 474066051432192σ2
+163712534317056σ + 25389989167104)µ8 + (139706960442σ10 + 2489442201882σ9
+19667440053936σ8 + 90885419798064σ7 + 272376170796816σ6 + 553486369904064σ5
+772370491431744σ4 + 730506530264832σ3 + 447694061333760σ2 + 160274306617344σ
+25389989167104)µ7 − (67559427555σ10 + 933013798244σ9 + 5688082731088σ8
+20240570983968σ7 + 46734537234528σ6 + 73257998984064σ5 + 78523014339072σ4
+55696311783936σ3 + 23696996705280σ2 + 4584303599616σ)µ6 − (28157518950σ10
+402032785240σ9 + 2471744214224σ8 + 8541639937344σ7 + 18133097662656σ6
+24191622839808σ5 + 19779778914048σ4 + 9044268585984σ3 + 1765642572288σ2)µ5
+(5390512692σ10 + 70243998096σ9 + 389050575360σ8 + 1187171367936σ7
+2155191936768σ6 + 2327029088256σ5 + 1383238798848σ4 + 349091389440σ3)µ4
+(1208928σ10 − 35357408σ9 − 499871872σ8 − 2310391296σ7 − 4954556160σ6
−5052658176σ5 − 1981946880σ4)µ3 +( −3847056σ10 − 30310336σ9 − 86482304σ8
−102706176σ7 − 35659008σ6 + 9704448σ5)µ2 − (114816σ10 + 1102080σ9 + 3784704σ8
+5514240σ7 + 2875392σ6)µ + 5376σ10 + 31744σ9 + 60416σ8 + 36864σ7
While J (ˆ µ1,σ)=0by deﬁnition, we have J (2σ/(8σ +9 ),σ) < 0, implying
that ˆ µ1 < 2σ/(8σ +9 ) .
(i-b) neighboring trade: ˆ µ1 <µ<ˇ µ and ¯ τtrade ≤ τ ≤ τtrade.
30In this case, λ1 lies in the interval of [1/3,1/2] from Lemma 5 (i).Since
τ0 (λ1) < 0, τ (1/3) > τ (λ1) for all λ1 ∈ [1/3,1/2].F u r t h e r m o r e , ¯ τtrade >
τ (1/3) for µ = ˇ µ, and hence τ > τ (λ1),w h i c hm e a n sy11 <y 13 at λ1 = λ3.
(ii) One-way trade to the center: ˇ µ<µ<ˆ µ2 and ¯ τtrade ≤ τ ≤ τtrade.
A direct computation yields
y11 − y13|λ1=λ3 =
α2σ (18µ − 4σ +4 µσ +3 µσλ1)
γµ(σλ1 +2 )
3
Since the RHS is increasing in µ and λ1, substituting µ =ˆ µ2 and λ1 =1 /2,
we have
y11 − y13|λ1=λ3 < −
2α2σ2 (19σ +1 2 6 )
3γ (5σ +1 8 )( σ +4 )
3 < 0
(iii) Full trade: µ<´ µ ≡ (σ2 − 4)/(10σ2 +4 8 σ +5 0 )and τ < ¯ τtrade.
The full trade condition µ<´ µ is equivalent to at λ
∗
1(¯ τtrade) > 0,w h i c h
the interior equilibrium condition at τ =¯ τtrade.
Since the stable equilibrium path λ
∗(τ) and its inverse function τc (λ1)
are increasing functions, we get
τc (λ1) > τc (0) =
4α(2 + 7µ + σ +5 µσ)
4+4 σ + σ2 +2 µ +2 µσ
> ¯ τtrade (27)
On the other hand, the deﬁnition (25) is revised by
τ (λ1)=
3αµ(2σ +3 )
µ +2 σ + σ2 +9 4 µσ − µσ2 +3 µσ(σ +2 )λ1
Since τ0 (λ1) < 0 holds, we have
τ (λ1) < τ (0) =
3αµ(2σ +3 )
µ +2 σ + σ2 +9 4 µσ − µσ2
<
3α´ µ(2σ +3 )
´ µ +2 σ + σ2 +9 4´ µσ − ´ µσ2
=
α(σ − 2)(2σ +3 )
3σ3 +1 8 σ2 +1 7 σ − 6
< ¯ τtrade (28)
where the second inequality is due to ∂τ (0)/∂µ>0 and the last inequality
is from σ > 2 which is from µ<´ µ. Putting (27) and (28) together, we have
τ (λ1) < ¯ τtrade < τc (λ1),w h i c hi sy11 <y 13 at λ1 = λ3.
31It is known in the two-dimensional dynamics that the equilibrium point
i san o d e( r e s p .s a d d l ep o i n t )i f|y11| > |y13| (resp. |y11| < |y13|).
A p p e n d i xF :P r o o fo fL e m m a5
(C6) stands for full trade between any pair of regions. Since the denomi-
nator of ∆V12(λ1,τ) is positive except λ1 =( σ +2 )/σ,d e ﬁne the numerator
of ∆V12(λ1,τ) by ∆V n
12(λ1,τ) for all λ1 6=( σ +2 )/σ. Because the implicit
function ∆V n
12(λ1,τ)=0is quadratic in τ in all cases of (C1), (C4), (C5)




Lemma 11 The function λ
∗
1(τ) is continuous for all domain of 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1/2
and 0 ≤ τ ≤ τtrade irrespective of the trade patterns.
Proof. From the implicit functional theorem, λ
∗
1(τ) is continuous inside
the cases of (C1), (C4), (C5) and (C6). Therefore, we only have to check the
continuity at the boundaries. However, say, at the boundaries of cases (C1)
and (C4), if ∆V12(λ1,τ)=0holds in case (C1), then this also holds in case
(C4). The same is true for all other boundaries.
Lemma 12 The functions τa (λ1) and τb (λ1) are real for all λ1 ∈ [1/2,(σ +2 )/σ)
except that there are at most 2 discontinuous points in the interval.
Proof. First, we consider the number of discontinuous points. The de-
nominator of τa (λ1) and τb (λ1) is common and quartic in λ1 with the pos-
itive coeﬃcient of (λ1)
4. Since, the denominator is shown to be negative at
λ1 =1 /2, (σ +2 )/σ,t h e r ee x i s ta tm o s tt w od i s c o n t i n u o u sp o i n t s .
Second, we show that τa (λ1) and τb (λ1) a r er e a l . T h ec o m m o nt e r m s
i nt h es q u a r er o o to fτa (λ1) and τb (λ1) are f(λ1),w h i c hi sd e ﬁned by (26).
f(λ1) is quartic in λ1 with a positive coeﬃcient of (λ1)
4. It is readily shown
that
f










and the larger inﬂexion point is outside the interval of [1/2,(σ +2 )/σ).
These imply that both λ1 =1 /2 and λ1 =( σ +2 )/σ − 0 are on the left-
hand side of the quartic curve with a positive slope. Since f(1/2) > 0,w e
have f(λ1) > 0 for all λ1 ∈ [1/2,(σ +2 )/σ),w h i c hm e a n sr e a lτa (λ1) and
τb(λ1).
32Lemma 13 When a stable equilibrium lying on τa (λ1) (resp. τb (λ1))d i s -
appears, then it will jump to the same τa (λ1) (resp. τb (λ1))o rt h ec o r n e r s
λ1 =0 ,1/2.
Proof. It is readily shown that ∆V12(λ1,τ)=0is quartic in λ1 in cases
(C1) and quadratic in λ1 in case (C6). Since limλ1→±∞ τa (λ1)= limλ1→±∞τb (λ1)=
0 holds for all cases of (C1), (C4), (C5) and (C6), τa (λ1) and τb (λ1) have at
most one trough (ˇ λ1,ˇ τ),a tw h i c haj u m pm a yo c c u r .
Case (C1). Suppose τa (λ1) has a peak (ˆ λ1,ˆ τ),s u c ht h a ti sˇ τ < ˆ τ in the
interval of [0,1/2], then a stable equilibrium path τb (λ1) may jump at the
trough (ˇ λ1,ˇ τb) to the diﬀerent curve τa (λ1). However, such a trough-peak
combination violates the property in that there are more than 4 solutions of
λ1 in ∆V12(λ1,(ˇ τ +ˆ τ)/2) = 0 as shown below.
From Lemma 12, τb (λ1) is discontinuous at most 2 points.
(i) If τb (λ1) is continuous in λ1 ∈ [1/2,(σ +2 )/σ),t h e nτb (λ1) neces-
sarily crosses the horizontal line τ =( ˇ τ +ˆ τ)/2 in (max{ˇ λ1, ˆ λ1},(σ +2 )/σ)
in addition to 4 points of intersection in [min{ˇ λ1, ˆ λ1},max{ˇ λ1, ˆ λ1}],t h u sv i -
olating the property.
(ii) If τb (λ1) is discontinuous only at ¯ λ1 ∈ (1/2,(σ +2 )/σ),t h e nτb (λ1)
goes to either −∞ or +∞. However, the sign of τb (λ1) does not change
in the vicinity of ¯ λ1 τb(λ1) since ¯ λ1 must be a repeated root of the quartic
denominator of τb(λ1). Hence, the above case (i) applies.
(iii) If τb (λ1) is discontinuous at two distinct ¯ λ1, ˜ λ1 with 1/2 < ¯ λ1 <
˜ λ1 < (σ +2 )/σ,t h e nτb (λ1) changes its sign in the vicinity of ¯ λ1, ˜ λ1.I f
limλ1→¯ λ1−0 τb(λ1)=−∞,t h e nτb (λ1) crosses τ =( ˇ τ +ˆ τ)/2 in (ˇ λ1, ¯ λ1),a n d
hence the number of intersection points with τ =( ˇ τ +ˆ τ)/2 exceeds 4.
On the other hand, if limλ1→¯ λ1−0 τb (λ1)=+ ∞,t h e ni tm u s tb et h a t
limλ1→¯ λ1+0 τb(λ1)=−∞ limλ1→˜ λ1−0 τb (λ1)=−∞ and limλ1→˜ λ1+0 τb (λ1)=
+∞.T h u s ,τb (λ1) crosses the horizontal line τ =( ˇ τ+ˆ τ)/2 in (˜ λ1,(σ +2 )/σ),
and hence the number of intersection points with τ =( ˇ τ +ˆ τ)/2 exceeds 4.
Cases (C4) and (C5). It is easily shown that the equilibrium path crosses
at most once at the boundary between cases (C1) and (C4) and at the bound-
ary between cases (C1) and (C5). Therefore, once a stable equilibrium path
crosses one of the boundaries, it will never cross again, implying that the
above trough-peak combination does not arise. Hence, it will be sure to hit
the corner λ1 =1 /2 (resp. 0)i nc a s e( C 1 )( r e s p .( C 4 ) ) .
Case (C6). Since ∆V12(λ1,τ)=0is quadratic in λ1, the above trough-
peak combination cannot arise.
33Lemma 13 together with Lemma 11 ensures that the stable equilibrium
path starting from λ
∗ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) at τ = τtrade will keep on the same
curve or hit the corners. The only exception occurs when dτa (λ1)/dλ1 =
dτb (λ1)/dλ1 = ∞, which corresponds to dλ
∗
1(τ)/dτ =0 .A t t h i s p o i n t ,
an equilibrium does not disappear, and the two stable curves τa (λ1) and
τb(λ1) a r ec o n n e c t e d . T h i si sc a s e( i i )w i t hµ<ˆ µ1,w h e r et h ep a t hﬁrst
moves toward λ1 =1 /2 and then moves back to λ1 =0 , resulting in (0,1,0).
Otherwise, the path moves according to case (i) with µ>ˆ µ1 and reaches
(1/2,0,1/2) monotonically. Finally, since there is no stable equilibrium path
approaching an interior solution of λ1 at τ =0 ,L e m m a5i sp r o v e n .
A p p e n d i xG :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
(i) In the case of neighboring trade, when λ2 =0 ,w eh a v e
∂ (V1 − V3)|λ2=0
∂λ1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
λ1=λ3=1/2
=
4α2σ[µ(11σ +3 6 )− 8σ]
3γµ(σ +4 )
3
which is negative for all µ ≤ µ∗
2, implying that λ
∗ =( 1 /2,0,1/2) is a stable
during the neighboring trade of τ > ¯ τtrade. This equilibrium continues during





Otherwise, (1/2,0,1/2) ceases to be an equilibrium, leading to the new equi-
librium (0,1,0) for a suﬃciently large period of time.
(ii) In the case of full trade, when λ2 =0 ,w eg e t
∂ (V1 − V3)|λ2=0
∂λ1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
λ1=λ3=1/2
=
2στ [µ(σ2 +1 4 σ +1 8 )+2 σ(σ +2 ) ]
3γµ(σ +2 )




µ(σ2 +1 4 σ +1 8 )+2 σ(σ +2 )








18α2µ2σ3(2σ +3 ) 2 (2λ1 − 1)




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
λ3=1−λ1
is maximized at λ1 =0 ,1.S o l v i n g
·






=s g n( ˇ µ1 − µ),w h e r e
ˇ µ1 ≡
(5σ +2 )( σ +2 )
8σ2 +2 5 σ +1 8+3
√
32σ4 +2 4 0 σ3 +4 8 9 σ2 +3 2 4 σ +3 6
The stability condition is therefore
µ>ˇ µ1 (30)
This equilibrium continues during τ > ¯ τtrade if V1 − V2|λ1=λ3=1/2,λ2=0 ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
¯ τbreak ≡
8α(1 − µ)
7µσ +6 µ +2 σ +1 2
< τ ≤ ¯ τtrade
where ¯ τbreak < ¯ τtrade holds for µ>2/11.S o l v i n g
·
λ2/λ2 =0at λ1 =1and




193σ4 +1 0 4 4 σ3 +1 9 3 2 σ2 +1 2 9 6 σ +1 4 4− 13σ2 − 50σ − 36
98σ2 +3 1 0 σ +2 5 2
However, it can be shown that ˇ µ1 > ¯ µ1 for all µ>2/11.
(iii) Finally, we consider the case that (1/2,0,1/2) b e c o m e su n s t a b l ew h e n




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
λ3=1−λ1
∂λ1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
τ=¯ τtrade
=
2σα2 (8σ2 − 17µσ2 − 19µσ − 72µ +1 6 σ)(2λ1 − 1)




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
λ3=1−λ1,τ=¯ τtrade
is maximized at λ1 =0 ,1/2 or 1.S o l v i n g
·
λ2/λ2 =0at
λ1 =1 /2 and 1 yields the stability conditions






(5σ +2 )( σ +2 )
2(7σ2 +3 0 σ +2 9 )








,min{˜ µ1, ˇ µ1}
¾
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Figure 3: Two stable equilibrium paths in Proposition 4: (i) the central region
shrinks and then disappears; (ii) the central region shrinks, but expands and















Figure 4: (C1) one-way trade from 1 and 3 to 2, (C2) one-way trade from 1 to
2 and neighboring trade between 2 and 3, (C3) autarky in 1 and one-way trade
from 2 to 3, (C3’) autarky in 3 and one-way trade from 2 to 1, (C4) one-way















Figure 5: (C1)-(C4) same as Figure 4, (C5) neighboring trade
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